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Abstract
In response to recent findings in cognitive linguistics, the paper sums up
the principles of ‘corporeal pragmatics’ as they have been developed so far.
At the centre of the author’s perceptually oriented investigation of natural
language stands the relation between natural language and perception. The
paper charges the philosophy of language and linguistics with having for too
long committed the sin of Wahrnehmungsvergessenheit, the forgetting of
taking for ‘true’ what our senses tell us. The author proposes to redress this
imbalance by an argument that linguistic meaning events rely essentially
on the activation of empty linguistic schemata by conceptually regulated,
iconic sign materials. Such a claim requires a redefinition of the Saussurean
signified, the concept, reference and deixis and other terms in the vocabulary
of the study of language. The paper concludes by suggesting that corporeal
pragmatics has serious implications for disciplines well beyond philosophy,
semiotics, and linguistics.
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Wahrnehmungsvergessenheit, the corporeal turn, Vorstellung, constraints,
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Introduction
Natural language, this paper argues, is fundamentally related to perception in the
broadest sense of the term, both in its linguistic evolutionary history and in its con-
temporary configurations. If this is so, then we are facing the ironic situation that
neither our dominant philosophical nor linguistic paradigms are in a position to
account for this relation. True, phenomenology promised some avenues conducive
to insights into the relation between language and perception. Sadly, though, they
have never been seriously pursued. Husserl’s theorisation of appresentation, men-
tal presentations of things absent, (Husserl 1973), Roman Ingarden’s elaboration
of this notion in the specifics of literary concretisations, (Ingarden 1930;1959),
Alfred Schutz’s analysis of language as the dominant form of typification (Schutz
1967;1959a;1959b) or Adolf Reinach’s speech act phenomenology of 1913 all pro-
vided fruitful pointers in the direction of the role which perceptual ingredients
play in natural languages, but they failed to inspire more recent philosophers, let
alone linguists. Nor have Heidegger’s protolinguistic gestures in the context of his
remarks of language and interpretation produced a major rethinking relevant to
the relation between language and perception (Heidegger 1962). Perhaps the most
promising path to perception in language was announced in the work of Merleau-
Ponty under the heading of the primacy of perception. But once again, the enter-
prise collapsed under the weight of Merleau-Ponty’s own self-doubt, or a renewed
interest in Husserl’s eidetic convictions, or perhaps because of his religious lean-
ings, when he reverted to the concession that language was after all a ‘logic in
contingency’ (Merleau-Ponty 1964:87f.) and that ‘there is an essence beneath us,
a common nervure of the signifying and the signified’ (1968:118; my emphasis).13 Principles of Corporeal Pragmatics
Logos rules once more, ‘the pre-existent Logos is the world itself’ (1962:xx). Thus
he terminated the primacy of perception.
A more recent contribution towards a perceptually oriented theorisation of nat-
ural language announced itself for a while in some of the French feminist writ-
ings, especially those of Luce Irigaray, Helen Cixous, and Julia Kristeva, of which
Kristeva’s are by far the most significant. In This Sex Which Is not One Irigaray
places the tactile at the forefront of her argument about the female experience of
language and world, telling us to forget truth and instead acknowledge the predis-
cursive reality of the body’ (Irigaray 1985:89). In ‘The Laugh of the Medusa’ He-
len Cixous likewise argues that woman signifies ‘with her body’; women should
‘write with their bodies’ and so create an ‘impregnable language that will wreck
partitions, classes, end rhetorics, regulations and codes’ (Cixous 1997:351;355).
Strong and exciting claims. However, the question arises whether either Irigaray or
Cixous have in fact been able to develop a theoretical base strong enough to tran-
scend their Saussurean heritage, which it seems to me remains a powerful obstacle
to their own argument (Ruthrof 2000:109-115). If there is a major impulse coming
out of French feminist writing for such a review it will probably emerge as a result
of Julia Kristeva’s psychoanalytic inspiration rather than from a direct engagement
with linguistics, including her own work on Saussure (Kristeva 1989). In a very
different book, In the Beginning Was Love: Psychoanalysis and Faith (Kristeva
1987) the author for the first time readily and fully embraces the body as an aspect
of meaning in order to ‘develop a powerful model of the human in which language
is not divorced from the body; “word” and “flesh” can meet at any moment, for
better or for worse’ (Kristeva 1987:6). A full, theoretical picture able to fulfil this
exciting promise is still to be published.
The third major impulse for a ‘corporeal turn’ in the theorisation of natural lan-
guage has come from cognitive linguistics and its neurological research backup.
As a result, language philosophy and linguistics, amongst other branches of the-
orisation, have recently been jolted out of their dogmatic slumber by a number
of significant findings in neurologically based research (Gallese and Lakoff 2005;
Verhagen 2005; Fauconnier and Turner 2002). Especially the Lakoff School has
played a major, though by no means uncontroversial, role in this respect. Barring
some of its more overbearing claims and especially its unsustainable anti-philo-
sophical hype, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to
Western Thought (Johnson and Lakoff 1999) is to be acknowledged as a pioneer-
ing case of this kind of research, which attempts to locate the roots of natural lan-
guage meanings, concepts, and metaphor in the sensory-motor neural functions of
the human brain. However successful this challenge will turn out to be, will have
to be seen. On thing appears to be certain: we can no longer assume that the re-
lation between natural language and perception is irrelevant to the philosophy of
language or linguistics. Unfortunately, many a theorisation of natural language has
refused to engage with this relation and so achieved results the positivist precision
of which bears little resemblance to what is actually going on in living speech.
Their frames of inquiry were conceived too narrowly. Writings which do attempt
to account for some of the complexities of natural language, such as theories of
speech acts, presuppositions, reference, deixis, and pragmatics very much look like
belated attempts at widening the Spanish boots of a too tightly conceived set of
starting principles. What is missing in this research is the question of the relation of
language and perception, a relation which may very well be at the heart of naturalThe Public Journal of Semiotics 14
language. Once again, positivist research reveals a paradox: precision in descrip-
tion and a certain elegance of argument are marred by too narrow a focus and hence
a discrepancy between its results and what actually goes on in the object of inquiry.
Corporeal pragmatics takes its broad methodological research inspiration from
a very different tradition: the later parts of Kant’s Critique of Judgment. Here we
learn that in judging complex phenomena it is appropriate to apply the double strat-
egy of ‘reflective’ and ‘teleological’ reasoning, the former which, in contemplat-
ing the function of details, is looking for a general law under which they can be
understood, the latter stipulating an interpretive umbrella beneath which the detail
appears in a larger and meaningful interpretive order (Ruthrof 2004). If this is a
good strategy and if the details of natural language only make sense under a broader
umbrella that includes perception, then our standard language philosophies and lin-
guistics have for a considerable time been flawed by a collective form of research
amnesia, a kind of Wahrnehmungsvergessenheit, or the forgetting of taking for true
what we experience with our senses.
Two major impediments to a rich description of language
Two founders of discourse largely responsible for the elimination of perception
and its relation to language are Gottlob Frege and Ferdinand de Saussure. From
very different points of departure, the one from mathematical logic, the other from
a critique of historical linguistics, Frege and Saussure have left in their wake two
separate traditions equally hostile to the investigation of the presence of perceptual
ingredients in natural language. In Frege’s case, the barring of subjective images
from sense marked the beginning of a history of semantics that took its cues increas-
ingly from the domain of formal signification. Having started analytical seman-
tics by analogical reasoning from geometry and arithmetic to a natural language
(German in his case), Frege made a radical move: he conflated two kinds of sense,
the formal sense of geometry and the kind of sense that characterises such natural
language terms as Morgenstern and Abendstern (Frege 1970). Thus he denied the
fundamental difference between an a priori sign system for which we first define
our terms before we play the formal game and a posteriori signification in natural
language, which is spoken, usually for a very long time, before it is described at all.
Formal sense can be governed unambiguously by definition, while the dictionaries
of natural languages, I argue, have an entirely different function: they guide us to
be able to activate the differential system of signifiers and their combinations by
way of relating them to our perceptual grasp of our world. The difference between
the two kinds of senses could not be any starker. Formal sense can be invented at
any time; natural language sense, by contrast, has evolved over a million years,
give or take a few, and so carries with it the semantic drift that cannot be separated
out from perceptual indication. But perhaps Frege’s most influential incision in the
history of semantics was his ban of Vorstellung from the description of language,
on the grounds that the image which one person may associate with a linguistic
expression cannot be identical with someone else’s mental, quasi-perceptual asso-
ciations. Frege’s reasoning here rests on the assumption that identity of meaning is
as essential to natural language as it is to formally empty propositions, a presuppo-
sition that is as erroneous as it is arbitrary. If, for instance, natural language is able
to function efficiently on the principle of significant overlap of imagined portions
of the world rather than on the principle of identity, Frege’s ban of Vorstellung
from sense loses much of its apparent cogency.15 Principles of Corporeal Pragmatics
It may just be the case that the TV images associated with the notion of ‘UN
peace  keepers’  is  entirely  sufficient  as  an  intersubjectively  shared,  nonverbal
ground for a common understanding of the meaning of the expression. Let me add
here too that the standard translation of Vorstellung as ‘idea’ is not helpful; it would
be more appropriate to translate Vorstellung as ‘perception modification’ or ‘per-
ceptual modification’. Unfortunately, the perceptual side of the German term is
likewise lost in the more recent analytical literature which, in the wake of Frege, ad-
dresses states of consciousness in terms of ‘propositional attitudes’. While propo-
sitional acts most likely do play a part in our mental states, they cannot replace the
much broader notion of Vorstellung . Such propositional imperialism looks poised
to lead us into yet another theoretical icul-de-sac. Of course, Frege cannot be held
guilty for the sins of his successors. After all, his goal was no more than the creation
of a Begriffsschrift, a modest form of symbolic notation not be taken as the basis
for a ‘thick’ description of natural language (Geertz 1973).
The other major impediment to a rich account of language can be located in the
pioneering work of the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (Saussure 1974). Here too,
one has to concede that it is not so much Saussure himself as his inattentive students
who recorded his lectures or more likely his successors who must bear most of the
blame. And yet, his strong emphasis on differential, syntactic relations paved the
way for an increasingly barren description of language as combinatory, as indeed
a kind of chess (Saussure 1974:22f.;88f.;110). Even though Saussure had insisted
that the signified and signifier played an equally important role, his minimal delin-
eation of the signified as ‘image’ and ‘concept’ led to the gradual demise of the
signified as ‘meaning’. Today, the literature not only in the humanities, but also
in some social sciences is full of talk of ‘signifiers’, as if they themselves were
able to be meaningful without signifieds (Laclau 1996). This trend was of course
strengthened by Saussure’s definition of the linguistic sign as arbitrary, a move
that increasingly favoured the signifier to the point where the signified is virtual-
ly abandoned, a position which however produces an embarrassing paradox: the
arbitrary and empty signifier must now take on the semantic load of the signified,
which its very definition does not permit. It is for this reason alone that Saussure’s
linguistic principle of arbitrariness needs to be revisited. Surprisingly, his general-
isation of arbitrariness to cover the linguistic sign as a whole has hardly been chal-
lenged, even though, on closer inspection, it rests conspicuously on a fallacious
pars pro toto form of reasoning. Because the signifier is arbitrary, Saussure says,
therefore the linguistic sign as a whole is likewise arbitrary, which includes the
signified as a vital part. Yet there is no argument for the signified to be rightly
regarded as arbitrary in the same way as the signifier. Saussure (or his students’
notes of his lectures), it would seem, has been rash. As we shall see, a somewhat
different conception of the linguistic sign in corporeal pragmatics will produce a
markedly different foundation for linguistics altogether. Suffice it here to say that
Saussure’s syntactic emphasis and rough definition of the linguistic sign have had
a detrimental effect on the question of the relation of language and perception. In-
deed, the vanishing signified in much contemporary literature is testimony to the
diminishing role we now grant the perceptual ingredients of natural language and
their modification in Vorstellung. And yet, without Vorstellung and its sedimenta-
tion in language we could not at all function as human beings.The Public Journal of Semiotics 16
Language and perception
Taking an evolutionary perspective, the approach to natural language via formal
sense and its differential relations or syntax reveals its historical motivation. Both
Frege’s calculus starting point and Saussure’s syntactic emphasis belong firmly to
the historical emergence of formal sign systems and scientific structuralism. Hav-
ing distilled from natural language such formal features as a priori sense and an
immanent matrix of differential relations we have now reapplied our findings to
describe our non-formal starting point, natural language. It should not be surpris-
ing however that language will always yield to the imposition of formal measures,
since these very measures were derived from language in the first place. This pro-
cess of formalisation can be specified as de-referentialisation and de-deictification,
both radical reductions of some of the essential perceptual ingredients of language.
Predictably, of course, the formal path turns out to be a cul-de-sac: once we have
de-materialised the specifics of human speech, the full formalisation bars the return
to our starting point, that is, the living speech of natural language.
A very different approach is needed to balance the formal account. To meet the
challenge of neurological research, we must now ask the question what role lan-
guage plays in the larger picture of the survival of humans from pre-linguistic ho-
minids to the present. To do so, I suggest to project a fictional, speculative spec-
trum stretching from ubiquitous, electromagnetic radiation and its readings by the
pre-human organism, nonconscious perception, and perceptual experience to lan-
guage and its derivatives, such as technical languages, formal sign systems and
the digital code. The unifying principles here are information uptake and informa-
tion processing, features that are shared to different degrees by all stages in this
evolutionary process. The opposite principles of differentiation have to do with
the varying degree to which, and the semiotic mode in which, information is ab-
sorbed, processed and controlled. In such a spectrum we can observe two chiastic,
parallel movements, a gradual reduction in information processing and at the same
time an increase in control. While information input gradually shrinks along the
entire spectrum from non-conscious perception to the Boolean code, our control
over the diminishing information increases sharply to the point of electronic mas-
tery of bytes in the digital bitstream. Whereas the early human organism had to
evolve under a barrage of excessive radiation, digital machinery is designed for
specific quanta of information intake and preconditioned output. For a very long
time the biological organism survived, it would seem, by selecting a small band
of suitable information from the ubiquitous electromagnetic radiation out of which
it constituted its perceptual world (Maud 2003). We now know that it is not our
perceptual experience but non-conscious perception that is largely responsible for
the way in which we experience our surroundings, the coloured world of objects.
After a long phase of perceptual experience, increasingly complex social structures
produced, one could speculate, an economisation of perceptual and gestural be-
haviour. Thus language evolved not at one stroke, as Levy-Strauss has suggested:
‘no matter what the moment and the circumstances of its appearance in the animal
scale, language could only have been born in a single stroke’ (Kristeva 1989:46).
Some critics suggest that he didn’t quite mean it that way, but in what way did he
mean it? Isn’t it much more realistic to assume that language, like everything else,
gradually evolved as a convenient and necessary economising matrix on top of
perceptual communication? Technical languages and their formal cousins appear
to be latecomers in this process, with the digital code their most recent descendent.17 Principles of Corporeal Pragmatics
In this picture, natural language occupies a central position between perception and
formal signification. If this is very roughly so, then it is curious that our dominant
theorisations of natural language have persisted on throwing light onto language
only from the angle of its own derivatives: formal, propositional approaches. A
case of Descartes before the horse?
Sandwiched  as  it  is  between  perception  and  its  technical  derivations,  lan-
guage  cannot  be  adequately  described  if  we  forget  its  perceptual  ground.
Wahrnehmungsvergessenheit may indeed prove a major obstacle in the search for
a linguistics appropriate to its task. What we need to ask beyond the findings by
formal and syntactic approaches is what perceptual ingredients have survived in
language to this day and in what form and what role they still play. This has not
been a popular tack to take. Even as socio-semiotic a linguist as Michael Halliday
shares the structuralist belief that in adult language mastery our performance is
essentially syntactic (Halliday 1975:141). But perhaps the opposite is the case, as
Eve Sweetser has persuasively argued, namely that every term, including function
words, reflects perceptual experience (Sweetser 1990). This does not mean that
Saussure’s differential syntactic relations are not important, what it does mean is
that logically prior to syntax language is fundamentally iconic, in the sense that
resemblance relations of an aural, tactile, gustatory, olfactory, and visual kind co-
determine linguistic meaning. Nor should we forget the emotional dimension of
language as a complex nonverbal sign system in its own right (L#dtke 2006; Tre-
varthen 2005). In this respect, recent insights in neurological research concerning
‘mapping’ constitute a seminal moment in the history of language philosophy and
linguistics (Fauconnier 1997). No doubt, a corporeal turn is finally in the offing.
Corporeal pragmatics
What then would a linguistics based on perceptual premises look like? At the mo-
ment we do not have a fully fledged, cognitive theorisation of language. In its ab-
sence, the following offers a thumb nail sketch of corporeal pragmatics, an at-
tempt at uniting the consequences of the cognitive emphasis on perception with
insights from Peircean semiotics and phenomenological investigations into a co-
herent schematisation. In corporeal pragmatics , language is an empty syntactic
matrix, with a meaning potential waiting to be activated. Language by itself does
not ‘mean’. Every natural language functions because its signifiers are typically
paired, as Saussure rightly tells us, with signifieds. Beyond Saussure, this amounts
to saying that mental materials, be they iconic or indexical, are ordered by concepts.
The signifier-signified connection, however, is not stable nor, as it is in structural
linguistics, reliant solely on intergrammatical relations. Rather, the linkage is fun-
damentally grounded in perceptual signification and so remains tentative, open to
historical change, semantic drift, and other meaning transformations. This adds
an important dimension to the Saussurean scenario: the differential relations with-
in language are made meaningful by a nonverbal Other, the totality of nonverbal
signs. In each meaning event, the language user, guided by the speech community,
momentarily stabilises the signifier-signified relation by choosing a specific clus-
ter of nonverbal signs with which to cash in a signifier by a signified. In corporeal
pragmatics, then, language is always parasitic on nonverbal semiosis. The ques-
tion to ask then is how this dependence relation can be made coherent.
To begin with, much of the standard vocabulary in the description of language
needs to be revised. Both reference and deixis will have to be redefined as ‘inter-The Public Journal of Semiotics 18
semiotic’ relations (Ruthrof 1997). Nor can there be anything like a semantics of
natural language in any strict sense because for meaning to occur at all, that is, for
language to function as language, it has to be used, which means it must be activat-
ed pragmatically. Even the most abstract ‘semantics’ handbook is always already
a pragmatics. Ironically, and in spite of its misleading name, there cannot be any
meaning in such a ‘semantics’; it requires a reader to activate its terms by nonverbal
means. Only when we fully formalise language, that is, replace each term by a place
holder (x, y) can we avoid pragmatic meaning activation in the sense of meaning
used here. Yet would we then still speak of a semantics? As Rudolf Carnap has
shown, it would make sense in such a case to speak of a ‘formal semantics’ only if
we were to systematically, that is, homosemiotically , pair a fully formal Language
1 with a secondary formal system, Language 2 (Carnap 1975). This suggests that
even in a fully fledged formal semantics, a singular language system does not suf-
fice to warrant the term ‘semantics’. One could argue that some such pairing also
takes place in natural languages, except that here the two semiotic systems to be
associated with one another are each of a different kind, they are heterosemiotic:
one is verbal, the other nonverbal, iconic. In this sense and contrary to formal sign
systems, natural language is in principle always already heterosemiotic.
As we have insisted, in corporeal pragmatics every instance of meaning relies
on the practice of iconic realisation. This means that the notion of ‘use’ always
involves mental states and so cannot be equated readily with Wittgenstein’s defi-
nition. Nonetheless, the Wittgensteinian notion can be accommodated as a second-
order public form of use (Wittgenstein 1953). In corporeal pragmatics, ‘use’ refers
specifically to the event of activation of empty schemata by nonverbal materials or-
dered into units of iconic signs. The signifier ‘slab’ is activated by nonverbal signs
including a typical size, the memory of a weighty object, the tactile impression of a
relatively smooth surface, as well as other visual, tactile, olfactory, proximic, and
kinetic readings. These are regulated by a concept and so together constitute the
signified of ‘slab’. No truth-conditional acrobatics are required to secure meaning;
once acquired, our concepts decide for us roughly when sufficient iconic, mental
materials have been brought to bear on the empty signifier to render it meaningful.
Iconicity is understood here in a broad sense. Peirce’s indexical signs are included
under the principle of semiotic resemblance relations in the present account on the
grounds that they display indirect iconic relations . The fact that indexical signs re-
quire more reconstructive interpretive labour than iconic signs affects the principle
of resemblance relation only insofar as they foreground Vorstellung, or perceptual
modification. What sort of nonverbal iconic materials, then, do we typically engage
in the processes of verbal meaning construction? The bulk of our nonverbal signs
are made up of olfactory, gustatory, thermal, gravitational, kinetic, aural, emotion-
al, somatic, haptic (internal), tactile (external), and visual readings. In this scenario
concepts are defined as social rules regulating linguistic directionality, the kinds
of materials to be activated, the required quanta of iconic signs and their combina-
tions, as well as the degree of schematisation to which we abstract iconic contents.
As a rule, in the process of meaning endowment, we do not proceed etymolog-
ically , but rather in terms of the current way a culture uses its language. We do
not activate ‘he is hot under the collar’ by recourse to thermal signs, but rather by
visual, kinetic, and emotional signs indicating anger. Both the degree of schema-
tisation and the quantity of mental materials effected by the concept in the event
of linguistic meaning is to be regarded as a function of sufficient semiosis, the19 Principles of Corporeal Pragmatics
communicative boundaries implicit in the specific circumstances of each meaning
event. Another characteristic of corporeal pragmatics is the heterosemiotic nature
of the activated linguistic signifier. Since the nonverbal materials by which we
transform our signifiers are heterosemiotic (olfactory, tactile, auditory, emotive,
somatic, etc.) the linguistic sign must have features that act as a regulator assimi-
lating its heterogeneous components. This task cannot be accomplished at the level
at which iconic contents are assembled, but rather at a more abstract level, at which
different nonverbal sign contents are homogenised. In corporeal pragmatics this
function is performed by the concept, not however in its current usage (Margolis
and Laurence 1999; Fodor 1998), but as defined below.
Central to corporeal pragmatics is the distinction between COSS (communica-
tive sign systems) and ROSS (read-only sign systems) (Ruthrof 1997). Our per-
ceptual grasp of the world tends to be both a combination of heterogeneous sign
readings and a letting others know about our readings. In either case, we are acti-
vating various semiotic systems, invariably involving many steps of sign transla-
tion. In each case, however, we typically transform an aliquid into an aliquo, the
minimal definition of signum. Accordingly, we can distinguish between read-on-
ly-signs and communicative signs. The social acts of looking, smelling, tasting,
touching and so on are always already potentially both readings and communica-
tive events, which also raises the old question whether we are able to perform non-
verbal semiosis without language. That we should be able to do so certainly flies in
the face of structuralist accounts, as for instance Saussure’s claim that “nothing is
distinct before the appearance of language” (Saussure 1974:111). This, of course,
is no more than a powerful prejudice. Our distant pre-linguistic ancestors would
surely not have survived if their hunting skills had not involved a high degree of
precision. Could a pre-linguistic hominid have procreated if it had lived in a ‘fog-
gy world’? At this point a certain degree of theoretical fudging comes into play:
they may not have spoken a language but their gestures were already linguistic in
the sense of a differentially related system of communication. Yet this is no more
than a thinly disguised form of linguistic imperialism. Moreover, to call all human
semiotic behaviour a ‘language’ defeats the very point of trying to distinguish nat-
ural language from other sign systems, as it does any attempt at trying to argue a
significant relationship between verbal and nonverbal semiosis. Here the Peircean
semiotic route is by far the better bet. In any case, the structuralist position shows
its theoretical weakness also in its failure to account for the experience of not being
able to find the appropriate words to describe subtle smell or taste distinctions, the
nuances of sexuality, daydreaming, in extreme emotional domains and other areas
of human life not well covered by linguistic signs. Cognitive science has shown us
that there is indeed a deep chasm between the myriad distinctions even decadent
humans are still able to draw in the olfactory, gustatory, and tactile domains and
the paucity of the vocabulary relevant to those distinctions in English, as in other
languages. In a persuasive study of nonverbal signification, A Natural History of
the Senses(Ackerman 1991), the author offers the reader a rich palette of examples
of nonverbal readings of the world, providing corporeal pragmatics with ample
evidence for the claim that the interaction of perception and language is indeed
crucial for a rich description of human speech. But what about linguistic expres-
sions by themselves?
Linguistic expressions and terms by themselves are perceptually empty signifiers
that belong strictly to the domain of the dictionary. This is why there are no mean-The Public Journal of Semiotics 20
ings in dictionaries. It is the reader who carries meaning into the dictionary by acti-
vating its empty schemata with the help of appropriate clusters of nonverbal signs.
Nor can the ‘as-structures’ that characterise dictionaries be called definitions prop-
er, for two reasons. For one, dictionary entries vary in length and detail, a fact that
does not square with any strict notion of ‘definition’. Second, dictionary entries are
typically substitute signifiers, which are collected after the social event of speech.
In other words, they are a posteriori descriptions. In formal systems this relation is
reversed, where signifier relations function as a priori foundations. Third, the def-
initions of a formal system neither require nor permit additional mental materials
for their activation. The definitions are their necessary and sufficient conditions.
Furthermore, formal sign systems have neither reference nor deixis (unless we pro-
vide a system of reference as a definitional extra), let alone referential background,
and certainly no implicit deixis . By contrast, in natural language, nonverbal ingre-
dients are essential in all these respects. Language points, that is, it is directional
and ostensive, a feature it has most likely inherited from its forerunners in gestural
protosemiosis. If language is an economizing grid gradually superimposed on ear-
lier forms of gestural communication, it is likely that the principle of inonverbal
ostension has survived in language as directionality. In corporeal pragmatics, lin-
guistic signs, that is, combinations of verbal signifiers and conceptually regulated
nonverbal sign clusters are argued to act as directional schemata. The speakers of a
natural language are trained to associate signifiers and signifieds in such a way that
they point in a certain direction in the world as it is realised by a speech communi-
ty. All linguistic expressions are learned as vehicles of cultural intentionality, the
directional agreements shared by the speech community. This includes pragmatic
scope, the right kind, size and quantity of the portion of the world selected, the
degree of schematisation, as well as sufficiency of indication. If there is lack of
clarity, further directional schemata are typically called upon. One could say that
in formal sign systems directionality acts like an unambiguous vector, in technical
language as a narrow beam, in ordinary social exchange directionality allows for a
certain interpretive leeway and negotiation, while in the breakdown of communi-
cation directionality becomes ubiquitous or shrinks to zero and so fails.
Linguistics speaks of deixis as a feature marking spatial, temporal, personal and
other features of the speech situation, a limited convention in the sense that it ad-
dresses only explicit deixis , the tip of the iceberg of general deixis, which includes
implicit deixis and also deictic background. The notion of ‘ego-centric particulars’
in philosophy is subject to the same kind of critique. In corporeal pragmatics ev-
ery single term of a natural language is typically double-directional, pointing at the
same time to its referential aspect and back to its deictic source. Even as simple
a preposition as ‘on’ illustrates this point, indicating as it does simultaneously its
referential ‘surface contact’ and its speaker and utterance position. In other words,
language is not just fundamentally referential (as well as self-referential), but also
essentially deictic (Bühler 1965). The radical generalisation of the deictic nature
of language has serious implications, especially for the description of culture and
communication.
Mentalism, subjectivism and social constraints
Following the advice of Chomsky in his recent return to matters linguistic, meaning
in corporeal pragmatics is being described here in a noncontroversial mental sense
(Chomsky 2000). The fact of mental states is a sine qua non, one that cannot be21 Principles of Corporeal Pragmatics
separated out from the processes that turn signifiers into signifieds. Mental states
are indispensable for the event of linguistic meaning. This would not even be de-
nied by supporters of arguments in favour of reducing mental states to the meagre
status of ‘propositional attitudes’, though such a position does little to enlighten
us on the question of the relation between language and perception. Nevertheless,
the charges of mentalism and subjectivism, to which corporeal pragmatics is even
more vulnerable than cognitive linguistics, must be disarmed. Enter the speech
community as a set of social constraints on individual linguistic performance. From
the first stuttering ventures into the complex field of our mother tongue, every as-
sociation between signifiers and the conceptually organised nonverbal materials
that make up our signifieds is guided not only once but always. Error is thus possi-
ble, but is gradually reduced (Trevarthen 1989;2001). On the other hand, this does
not mean that the activation of signifiers by iconic signs need be identical in similar
speech situations; rather, it only has to be sufficiently similar to guarantee the so-
cial functioning of linguistic communication. Thus no two persons of a culture are
likely ever to perform identical meaning operations; sufficient overlap is what has
to be stipulated. Differences in gender, class, age groups and professions, as well
as ‘semantic drift’, neologisms, intellectual capacity and other factors all qualify
as social constraints, as much as they are subject to them.
Other constraints
Nonetheless, communication rests on members of a speech community making
recognisably similar kinds of connections between signifiers and signifieds. They
do so on the reciprocal assumption that normally no crassly deviant associations
are being formed, an assumption that is supported on the whole by linguistic prac-
tice. The relative freedom of experimental poetry only underlines rather than ques-
tions this observation. The ‘reality check’ which every speech community em-
ploys to guarantee a reasonable alignment between speech and perceptual reality
can be called sufficient semiosis (Ruthrof 1997: 48f.; 2000:140-150). Sufficient
semiosis replaces truth-conditions by providing a negotiatory monitoring practice.
Speech partners decide whether enough interpretation has occurred, whether there
is sufficient promise of mutual understanding to continue a linguistic exchange, or
whether it is advisable to terminate the exchange as fruitless. In this practice the
question of whether something is the case or not does indeed occur, but has no
effect on the problematic of meaning. Simply put: meaning precedes truth. Having
said this, there is yet another level of constraint which affects all cultures: the deep
constraints of the universe that every culture interested in survival has articulated.
No pragmatics can ultimately avoid this metaphysical side of language. The pre-
ferred metaphysic of corporeal pragmatics could be described as an autopoietic,
inferential realism. This suggests that human beings are organisms that bump into
the world in such a way that their nonverbal and, over the last million years or
so, also their linguistic responses, optimise survival. The way the human organism
respects the deep constraints of the universe is by inferential response. Humans
have learnt how to read those constraints as reflected in, or ‘shining through’, their
own signifying practices, verbal as well as nonverbal. This explanatory scheme can
be called autopoietic in the sense that humans, like other organisms, are regarded
as ‘self-creating’ in interaction with their immediate environment, their Umwelt
(Uexküll 1982; Maturana 1980; Varela 1980;1993). It was Kant who initiated the
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of ‘ein organisiertes und sich selbst organisierendes Wesen’. The metaphysics of
corporeal pragmatics can also be viewed as an inferential realism in the sense that
it does not deny the existence of a mind independent universe, with the proviso
that whatever we know about it is by way of inferential procedure, another Kantian
motif. Inference, however, also plays a powerfully creative role in language in the
form of Vorstellung or perceptual modification.
The role of Vorstellung in language
Vorstellung has for some time had a very bad press in linguistics and language
philosophy outside phenomenology. Especially under the onslaught of theories of
mental states as ‘propositional attitudes’ Vorstellung has widely given way to cal-
culus thinking. And yet, Vorstellung as a spectrum of mental performance stretch-
ing from the most realist reconstructions of daily experience to the wildest fan-
tasies demonstrably plays a vital role in linguistic practice. Again, it is cognitive re-
search and such non-propositional notions as ‘cognitive maps’ (Finke 1989), ‘map-
ping’ (Fauconnier 1997) and ‘conceptual blending’ (Fauconnier and Turner 2002;
Hutchins 2005) that have reopened the path to the question of what precisely this
role could be. In the speculative programme of corporeal pragmatics, Vorstellung
is foundational. An embarrassment to post-Saussurean linguists and post-Fregean
philosophers alike, the prominence of Vorstellung in natural language is difficult
to deny. This is certainly so to the degree to which language draws on, reflects,
and expresses typical mental activities. Perceptual modification functions as the
Vorstellung of the actual (what we actually taste, smell, touch); in realist represen-
tation as the Vorstellung of the absent; in memory as the Vorstellung of the past
(e.g. a painful emotion); in prediction as the Vorstellung of the future; in suggestion
as the Vorstellung of the tentative; in certitude as the Vorstellung of what seems
compelling; in hope as the Vorstellung of what we wish will be the case; in fantasy
as the Vorstellung of the possible and impossible; in dream as the Vorstellung of
the unconscious; in nightmares the Vorstellung of what is emotionally disturbing
and unbearable; in hallucination as the Vorstellung of the counter-factual; in utopia
as the Vorstellung of a desirable world; or in dystopia as the Vorstellung of a catas-
trophic world (Ruthrof 2005). To the extent to which these activities are communi-
cated verbally, Vorstellung is an indispensable, quasi-perceptual ingredient of nat-
ural language. It is the engine which puts at our disposal a vast repertoire of non-
verbal signs for linguistic activation. To drive home the point of the centrality of
Vorstellung as perceptual modification in language and its description in corporeal
pragmatics one could characterise language as being no more or less than a set of
instructions for how to imagine and act in the world.
Repair work on the linguistic sign
Given what has been said, the first term to be redefined is the Saussurean linguistic
sign itself. In structural linguistics, the linguistic sign is made up of an unmotivated
(arbitrary) verbal signifier and an equally unmotivated (i.e., arbitrary) signified. In
corporeal pragmatics, the signifier remains the same as in Saussure, except that
its arbitrariness is now understood as the result of a long history of ‘iconic disem-
bodiment’ (Ruthrof 2000:85-97). The signified on the other hand requires serious
repair work. It now consists of two elements, a concept and quasi-perceptual, icon-
ic materials, the former acting as a social rule prescribing the kind of nonverbal
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signifiers are activated by iconic signs, producing a signified under the multiple
constraints of a concept. In habitual meaning performance, the process of activation
happens at synaptic speed; in consciously interpretive meaning events we tend to
survey a number of possible signifieds before completing the meaning event or fail
to proceed to meaning altogether. This is why the traditional description of con-
ceptuality in propositional terms is unsatisfactory; it fails to account for the time
required for interpretive labour. Ironically, this tradition can still be discovered in
the otherwise radical revision of the concept in Deleuze and Guattari who believe
that the concept occurs at ‘infinite speed’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994). In all com-
plex interpretive situations and especially in pedagogy dealing with children and
mentally challenged language users this process deserves the most meticulous at-
tention. Having said this, we are now in a position to redefine the signified and its
components.
Redefining the concept
In corporeal pragmatics, the signified now consists of a concept and nonverbal
materials, available in the form of iconic signs. In this definition, the signified is no
longer a unitary notion but divides into two distinct components, a regulatory con-
cept and the nonverbal materials that allow us to imagine a quasi-perceptual version
of a portion of the world. The concept is to be defined as a (1) social, directional
rule which determines (2) the kind and (3) quantity of nonverbal, quasi-perceptual
materials to be activated in the constitution of the linguistic sign, as well as (4) the
degree of schematisation to which those materials are to be transformed to consti-
tute linguistic meaning. In greater detail, the concept functions (1) as a regulator
of the direction to which our mental gaze is directed by verbal expressions (‘this
state of affairs, not that’). This is so because we have learned what to focus on in
response to the linguistic expressions of our mother tongue. (2) The concept also
regulates the kind of iconic materials we have at our disposal for the activation of
empty verbal schema. Typically, iconic signs so regulated are olfactory, gustatory,
aural, kinetic, proximic, thermal, gravitational, haptic (internal), tactile (external),
emotional, somatic, visual and other nonverbal readings of the world. Such signs
can range from preconscious uptakes of electromagnetic radiation processed by the
brain without perceptual experience to fully-fledged and consciously experienced
clusters of resemblance relations, a point that will prove important once more to-
wards the end of the paper. (3) The concept functions as a regulator of the quantity
required for the identification of a verbally indicated item. Having observed that
the quantity of iconic signs regulated by concepts is a function of sufficient semio-
sis, we need to add the qualification that the monitoring effects of sufficient semio-
sis are subtly adjusted to different circumstances and speech situations. In habitual
speech, sufficient semiosis is automated and minimal, hence the impression of ‘in-
finite speed’; in interpretive use, it is as complex as communication requires, and
amongst linguistically challenged individuals the process can be laboured, requir-
ing special attention. Such complications may appear to violate the kind of rules
we tend to associate with William of Okham. After all, we are only dealing with
linguistic meaning. Why are there so many components? Where is the razor? Un-
fortunately, nothing could be less appropriate to the facts. The sobering insight here
is that it is not only the social monitoring processes that are multi-faceted, the sign
relations in the process of meaning construction themselves are anything but sim-
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sarily suitable for integration into a uniform signified. Iconic signs systems are dis-
tinguishable by the kind of biological, perceptual heritage they carry, depending on
which of our senses they translate into semiotic units. In other words, the character
of different iconic signs reflects the differences between our neurologically distin-
guishable perceptual realisations. Olfactory signs, for example, are fundamentally
heterogeneous if compared with visual signification. Likewise, auditory readings
are heterogeneous if compared with gustatory signs, such as specific taste recogni-
tions. This relation is conspicuous in meaning events where the signifiers require
activation by iconic signs that belong to perceptual domains normally regarded as
incommensurable, as is the case typically in metaphor. Here the meaning event is
retarded as a result of the non-linguistic, quasi-perceptual interpretive labour re-
quired before the heterosemiotic ingredients can be assembled under a compati-
ble series of signifieds (Ruthrof 1997). Accordingly, we can specify the regulatory
task of the concept further: concepts regulate heterosemiotic iconic materials into
intersemiotic schematisations. (4) The concept, then, functions also as a regulator
of the degree of schematisation to which each meaning event subjects the kind
and quantity of iconic signs selected with the help of the concept. The process of
schematisation, I suggest, follows the kind of principles discussed by Husserl under
the terms of specification and generalisation, on the one hand, and materialisation
and formalisation, on the other, two pairs that form the two intersecting axes of
all possible abstraction. (Husserl 1969) The degree of abstraction (generalisation
or even formalisation) performed by the language user depends primarily on the
specifics of the speech situation, language register, discursive domains, genre, and
a range of other factors. In philosophical discourse the conceptual schematisation
of iconic materials will be typically high, at times to the point of formalisation,
while in a story telling situation a good deal of iconicity will be retained to allow
Vorstellung (perceptual modification) to produce a richly portrayed slice of world
by means of verbal expressions. Yet no matter how schematic or richly iconic our
signifieds may be in any given speech event, the fact of iconicity itself is crucial.
Corporeal pragmatics here follows the profound Peircean insight that human scale
comprehension relies always on the translation of whatever signification we are
entertaining into iconic signs, that is, resemblance relations (Peirce 1.158).
Kinds of concepts
The degree of schematisation of iconic contents is at the heart of the question of how
we can reconcile perception and natural language. In the scenario sketched here,
the relation between the two varies according to the kind and degree of schema-
tisation of quasi-perceptual materials effected in the linguistic sign as a result of
the regulatory work performed by the concept. This at the same time allows us to
describe the character of different kind of concepts. Depending on the degree of
generality and formalisation, concepts can be distinguished, somewhat arbitrarily,
as hard-edged, soft-edged, or soft-core. Hard-edged concepts are formal logical
concepts in which deixis and reference are reduced to zero. They also include nu-
merical concepts which display traces of social iconicity (counting). Soft-edged
concepts comprise all theoretical concepts governed by definitional descriptions;
they have deixis (theoretical perspective) and reference (the kind of world to which
they apply), that is, they display curtailed iconicity. Typical concepts in this cat-
egory are ‘differance’; the ‘ontic-ontological difference’; ‘transcendental reason-
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recurrence of the same’; and other philosophical notions governed by definitional
descriptions without however being strictly formally determined. By contrast, the
bulk of natural languages is made up of soft-core concepts which organise iconic
materials according to something like Russell’s principle of ‘vagueness’ (Russell
1923). ‘Milk’, ‘running’, ‘anxiety’, ‘hollow’, ‘go-slow strike’, ‘please help me’, as
well as prepositions (‘on’, ‘in’, ‘at’) and the function words of natural language
(e.g. ‘but’, ‘and’, ‘if’) all require the activation by iconic materials regulated by
concepts in order to produce linguistic meaning. Their concepts are regarded as
‘soft-core’ because they cannot be shown to have either a formal definitional cen-
tre, or a Husserlian ‘eidetic’ essence, or a set-theoretical boundary guaranteeing
definitional certitude. What they do display is a roughly shared, or intersubjective-
ly agreed upon ‘core’ meaning with a sort of meaning ‘halo’ of diminishing hori-
zonality.
Reviewing reference and deixis as intersemiotic relations
While we can always add referential and deictic features arbitrarily to any formal
sign system, in natural language both reference and deixis are necessary condi-
tions. Moreover, natural language reference and deixis are very different creatures
if compared with their logical cousins. To complicate matters, and as the example
of Frege’s conflation of two kinds of sense showed, natural language in addition
also always already has what we can call referential and deictic background . This
applies as much to realist speech as to jokes and fictional uses of language, the
main difference being that in fictions reference and deixis are constructed by anal-
ogy in Vorstellung (perceptual modification) rather than by perceptual assurance.
Importantly, in corporeal pragmatics reference and deixis are redefined as inter-
semiotic relations. This avoids the naïve realism of post-Fregean semantics and
the idealism of post-Saussurean linguistics. While the Fregean position is guilty
of aligning the sign system of language illegitimately with the object system of
the actual world, two incommensurate domains lacking a tertium comparationis,
the Saussurean scheme is deficient in the sense that reference and deixis are no
more than internal, syntactic relations, which fails to account for how they gear into
the nonverbal world of perception. Corporeal pragmatics absolves such aporias
by its ‘zoo-semiotic’ and autopoietic evolutionary starting principles. World and
language are aligned on the same plane of abstraction by regarding them as semi-
otic systems, the world as the sum of iconic signs and language as a heterosemi-
otic combination of schematised iconicity, conceptual rules, and verbal semiosis.
Reference then can be viewed as a relation between verbal expressions and specif-
ic clusters of iconic signs with resemblance testable relations to the actual world.
Much the same can be said of deixis, redefined as an intersemiotic relation between
deictic verbal markers and the iconcity with which we can reconstruct speech sit-
uations in the actual world.
Introducing referential and deictic background
Yet marked or explicit reference and deixis are only the obvious directional devices
with which language points beyond itself to a nonverbal reality. From the perspec-
tive of meaning construction, by far the more intriguing features of language are
their implicit counterparts: referential and deictic background. Here we find our-
selves in linguistically uncharted waters. And yet, without sensitive attendance to
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making, especially in intercultural exchange, such as translation. Not surprisingly,
it is such features that further widen the chasm between natural languages and their
formal relations. And once again, without iconicity we would be hard pressed to
imagine the cultural specifics that make up the referential and deictic background
of verbal utterances. Propositional abbreviations will not do and, in any case, can
only be achieved after the fact of cultural specificity, such as the typical smells of
a regional cuisine and its discourse. These are to be carefully distinguished from
specific reference and deixis, which are embedded in such backgrounds. Unlike
technical and formal languages, all natural language expressions exhibit this double
background in the sense of the kind of world in which both reference (to objects)
and deixis (reference to speakers) are interpreted to belong. As such, referential
and deictic background is the broad, implicit general nonverbal, semiotic backdrop
that is habitually assumed by speakers and readers of a shared culture. To outsiders
this tacit knowledge is a major interpretive hurdle. This is why referential and de-
ictic background affect the event of meaning most strongly when we are dealing
with cultural difference and the historically distanced text. Referential and deictic
backgrounds, then, are essential ingredients of the signified, though typically dis-
tributed over whole texts, and both are accessible to language users in a quasi-per-
ceptual manner. Here too, then, Vorstellung as modified perception acts as a bridge
between language and world.
Corporeal pragmatics and the ‘Myth of the Given’
The distinction in corporeal pragmatics between iconic readings and concepts is
crucial here also for another reason. Iconic readings, nonconscious, conscious, re-
alist and otherwise bridge the traditional, sharp divide between brute reality and
conceptual experience, a divide which is as prominent in the philosophical litera-
ture as it is dissatisfying (Davidson 1984; Sellars 1956). We are unable as humans,
the argument goes, to have access to brute reality without concepts. In other words,
concepts block our direct access to the ‘Given’. In contrast, corporeal pragmatics
proposes arguments for a continuum from electromagnetic radiation to perceptu-
al experience, natural language and beyond language to artificial sign systems, a
spectrum that allows us to have it both ways: yes, our biological bodies do have di-
rect access to the ‘Given’; and, yes, our conscious experience accesses brute reality
with the help of concepts, whereby concepts govern biologically given iconicity.
While iconic uptake stretches all the way from the human organism’s earliest up-
take of ubiquitous radiation and so provided us with a non-consciously accepted
coloured object world, concepts kick in at a certain evolutionary phase to add so-
cial, cultural control to this biological scenario. In this respect, cognitive linguistics
seems to be letting its own side down. While its proposal of the ‘embodied concept’
respects the continuum, it fails to account for the difference between the biologi-
cally given materials, the concept as neural structure and the concept as social pro-
duction (Lakoff and Johnson 1999). At the same time, the asymmetrical relation
between iconic readings and concepts proposed here also places propositional ap-
proaches, as for instance Fodor’s conceptual atomism, into a broader perspective
(Fodor 1998). Fodor’s choice of an atomistic conceptual starting point is dangling
unsupported in mid air. What is it, corporeal pragmatics asks, that his concept or-
ganises? The answer would seem to be ‘iconicity’, that is the sum of pre-concep-
tual, biologically provided resemblance relations. Nor are concepts imposed out
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schematise iconic readings for specific conscious, experiential and social purposes.
The asymmetrical relation between iconic readings and concepts permits us indeed
to have it both ways: our concepts regulate our direct, iconic access to the ‘Given’
(Sellars 1956). As economising matrix gradually laid over perception, language
optimises both principles. What I am suggesting here, then, is that the explanation
of human perceptual grasp and natural language along the double axis of iconicity
as a pre-linguistic, indeed pre-conscious, human faculty and conceptuality as a so-
cial, regulatory function of iconic materials, permits us to transcend the traditional
divide of brute reality and human understanding, of what is biologically Given and
what is socially constructed.
Conclusion: implications for other disciplines
At the centre of corporeal pragmatics we have found an elaboration of the Saus-
surean signified from his minimal indication that ‘image’ and/or ‘concept’ are to be
seen as components. As it turned out however, the review offered required a much
more radical transformation of the Saussurean schema than might have been ex-
pected: from an idealistically conceived, self-contained, syntactically driven notion
of language into a heterosemiotic, partly biologically and partly socio-culturally
constrained picture of natural language. At the centre of corporeal pragmatics we
placed iconicity and its regulation by concepts as social rules, a move that permit-
ted the long neglected question of the relation of verbal expressions and perception
to be raised as a respectable problematic in the study of natural language. By way
of conclusion, the so redefined signified with its conceptually governed iconicity
can be argued to have fruitful implication for disciplines well beyond language
philosophy, linguistics and semiotics.
What for example does it mean to strive for a ‘thick’ description of culture, in the
sense in which Clifford Geertz introduced the term, if not to write and document
the cultural Other in such a way that its iconicity, the resemblance relations of their
actual world can be captured as richly as possible? (Geertz 1973). No mere ver-
biage, less even propositional summaries, can do this kind of job. What is needed
are both a language and a conception of language conducive to nonverbal, iconic
enrichment. What Geertz has indicated applies to all cultural study, from anthro-
pology to history, literature and cultural studies, to sociology, education, and me-
dia studies. Why do students vote with their feet, leaving their linguistics and lit-
erature classes for the viewing rooms of media studies? Perhaps because we have
managed to theorise the richness of cultural life out of traditional subjects, while
iconicity continues to exert its powerful attraction in film. With its emphasis on the
nonverbal, corporeal pragmatics may be able to assist in re-invigorating some of
the disciplines that have natural language at their core.
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